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What Is Regulation F (12 CFR Part 1006), and What Did It Add to the FDCPA?

Regulation F is the CFPB's implementing rule for the FDCPA, codified at 12 CFR part 1006. Two final rules — 85 FR 76734 and 86 FR 5766 — both took effect November 30, 2021. Beyond restating the statute, it adds telephone call-frequency presumptions, electronic communication rules, a restructured validation notice, a flat bar on suing time-barred debt, and three-year record retention.

When did Regulation F take effect, and was the effective date ever delayed?

Regulation F was finalized in two pieces. The conduct rule was published at 85 FR 76734 on November 30, 2020, with the Federal Register DATES line reading "DATES: This rule is effective November 30, 2021." The disclosure and time-barred debt rule was published at 86 FR 5766 on January 19, 2021, carrying the ACTION line "Final rule; official interpretation" and the DATES line "This rule is effective on November 30, 2021." The Bureau issued a proposal on April 7, 2021 — published April 19, 2021 at 86 FR 20334 — to delay both "by sixty days, until January 29, 2022." That proposal was withdrawn effective September 1, 2021 at 86 FR 48918, where the Bureau stated: "The Bureau is withdrawing that proposal for the reasons provided in this document. The Debt Collection Final Rules will take effect on November 30, 2021." No delay occurred. The codified source note for 12 CFR part 1006 reads "85 FR 76887, Nov. 30, 2020, unless otherwise noted," and the authority citation is 12 U.S.C. 5512, 5514(b), 5532 and 15 U.S.C. 1692l(d), 1692o, 7004. As of July 2026, the only rulemakings touching the codified text since are the corrections at 87 FR 65668 (Nov. 1, 2022) and the CFPB's non-substantive "Agency Contact Information" final rule at 88 FR 16531 (Mar. 20, 2023, effective Apr. 19, 2023), which the CFR's own amendment notes pinpoint as 88 FR 16538. A direct comparison of the 2023 and 2025 annual CFR editions of part 1006 shows the only differences are office and title names and those added amendment notes — no operative text changed.

Who does Regulation F apply to?

12 CFR 1006.1(c)(1) provides that, except as to state exemption applications under 1006.108 and appendix A, "this part applies to debt collectors, as defined in § 1006.2(i), other than a person excluded from coverage by section 1029(a) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, title X of the Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 5519(a))." Section 1029(a) is the motor vehicle dealer carve-out. The definition in 1006.2(i)(1) tracks 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6): principal-purpose businesses and those who "regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, to another," plus creditors using a false name, plus — for purposes of 1006.22(e) only — persons in the business of enforcing security interests. Seven exclusions follow at 1006.2(i)(2)(i) through (vii), ending with a private entity operating a bad check enforcement program complying with section 818. One narrowing detail sits in 1006.1(c)(2): "Section 1006.34(c)(2)(iii) and (c)(3)(iv) applies to debt collectors only when they are collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service as defined in § 1006.2(f)." Regulation F does not extend the FDCPA to first-party creditors. A creditor's own collections operation remains outside the part, though it remains subject to the CFPA's UDAAP prohibition and to state law.

What did Regulation F add that the FDCPA statute does not contain?

Regulation F does more than restate 15 U.S.C. 1692. The additions that matter operationally are: the telephone call frequency presumptions in 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2), which the statute never supplied; a prohibition in 1006.14(h) on communicating through a medium the person has asked the collector not to use, with three narrow exceptions; the "limited-content message" construct in 1006.2(j), a voicemail with prescribed required and optional content "and that includes no other content," which is an attempt to communicate but not a "communication"; email and text message bona fide error procedures in 1006.6(d)(3) through (5); a mandatory electronic opt-out disclosure in 1006.6(e); a restructured validation notice in 1006.34 built around an "itemization date" chosen from five reference dates and a defined "validation period"; an overshadowing prohibition and a Model Form B-1 safe harbor in 1006.38(b); a flat prohibition on suing or threatening suit on time-barred debt in 1006.26(b); a prohibition on furnishing to a consumer reporting agency before contacting the consumer in 1006.30(a); a prohibition in 1006.30(b)(1) on selling, transferring for consideration, or placing for collection a debt the collector "knows or should know" has been paid, settled, or discharged in bankruptcy; a delivery standard in 1006.42(a)(1) requiring disclosures be sent "in a manner that is reasonably expected to provide actual notice, and in a form that the consumer may keep and access later"; and a three-year record retention rule in 1006.100.

How many collection calls does Regulation F allow before the presumption flips?

12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2) sets two-way presumptions, and the operative wording matters. Under 1006.14(b)(2)(i), a debt collector "is presumed to comply" with 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) if it places a telephone call "to a particular person in connection with the collection of a particular debt" neither "(A) More than seven times within seven consecutive days; nor (B) Within a period of seven consecutive days after having had a telephone conversation with the person in connection with the collection of such debt." The rule adds that "The date of the telephone conversation is the first day of the seven-consecutive-day period." Seven calls therefore sits inside the presumption; the eighth call within the window is what exceeds it. Under 1006.14(b)(2)(ii), exceeding either prong flips the presumption the other way — the collector "is presumed to violate" the prohibition. Three categories of calls are excluded from the counts by 1006.14(b)(3): calls placed with the person's prior consent given directly to the collector and within seven consecutive days of receiving it; calls "Not connected to the dialed number"; and calls placed to the persons described in 1006.6(d)(1)(ii) through (vi). Under 1006.14(b)(4), "particular debt means each of a consumer's debts in collection," with a special rule aggregating student loan debts serviced under a single account number. Both presumptions are rebuttable, and compliance with 1006.14(b) speaks only to call frequency under section 806(5), not to the rest of FDCPA section 806.

What does Regulation F require for the validation notice?

12 CFR 1006.34(a)(1) requires a debt collector to provide validation information either by sending a validation notice in the manner required by 1006.42 — in the initial communication or "Within five days of that initial communication" — or by providing the information orally in the initial communication. An exception in 1006.34(a)(2) relieves the collector of the five-day mailing where the consumer has paid the debt before the notice would be due. "Initial communication" is defined in 1006.34(b)(2) and excludes formal pleadings in a civil action and certain Internal Revenue Code, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, and data-breach notices. Content is built around the "itemization date" in 1006.34(b)(3), which must be one of five ascertainable reference dates: last statement date, charge-off date, last payment date, transaction date, or judgment date. The "validation period" in 1006.34(b)(5) is "the period starting on the date that a debt collector provides the validation information required by paragraph (c) of this section and ending 30 days after the consumer receives or is assumed to receive the validation information," and the collector "may assume that a consumer receives the validation information on any date that is at least five days (excluding legal public holidays identified in 5 U.S.C. 6103(a), Saturdays, and Sundays) after the debt collector provides it." Note the asymmetry: the five days in 1006.34(a)(1)(i)(B) carries no such exclusion, while the five days in 1006.34(b)(5) does. During the validation period, 1006.38(b)(1) prohibits collection activities or communications that "overshadow or are inconsistent with" the disclosure of dispute and original-creditor rights, and 1006.38(b)(2) provides that a collector using Model Form B-1 as described in 1006.34(d)(2) "has not thereby violated" that prohibition. Under 1006.38(c) and (d)(2), a request for original-creditor information or a dispute "submitted by the consumer in writing within the validation period" triggers a duty to cease collection until the collector responds as specified.

What does Regulation F say about email, text messages, and a consumer's choice of communication medium?

12 CFR 1006.14(h)(1) provides that a debt collector "must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a person through a medium of communication if the person has requested that the debt collector not use that medium to communicate with the person." This is medium-specific and broader than the statutory cease-communication right in 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c), which is debt-specific and requires a writing. Three exceptions appear at 1006.14(h)(2): a content-limited electronic confirmation of an opt-out request; a single response through the same medium where the person initiated contact using a medium they had asked the collector not to use; and communication through that medium where otherwise required by applicable law. Separately, 1006.6(e) requires that an electronic communication or attempt to communicate include "a clear and conspicuous statement describing a reasonable and simple method by which the consumer can opt out of further electronic communications," and forbids requiring any fee or any information beyond the consumer's opt-out preferences and the address or number at issue. 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(3) then supplies procedures that are "reasonably adapted, for purposes of FDCPA section 813(c)," to avoid a bona fide error resulting in prohibited third-party disclosure, keyed to email addresses qualifying under 1006.6(d)(4) and text-message numbers qualifying under 1006.6(d)(5). The creditor-notice pathway at 1006.6(d)(4)(ii) requires, among other things, that the creditor obtained the address from the consumer, used it for the account, and sent a prior clear and conspicuous transfer notice stating a deadline to opt out "at least 35 days after the date the notice is sent." Under 1006.42(b), the notice required by 1006.34(a)(1)(i)(B) and the disclosures described in 1006.38(c) or (d)(2)(i), when sent electronically, must comply with section 101(c) of the E-SIGN Act.

What does Regulation F say about credit reporting and time-barred debt?

Two provisions. First, the anti-parking rule at 12 CFR 1006.30(a)(1): a debt collector must not furnish information about a debt to a consumer reporting agency before the collector either "Speaks to the consumer about the debt in person or by telephone" or "Places a letter in the mail or sends an electronic message to the consumer about the debt and waits a reasonable period of time to receive a notice of undeliverability." During that reasonable period the collector "must permit receipt of, and monitor for, notifications of undeliverability from communications providers," and if one arrives must not furnish until the paragraph is otherwise satisfied. A special rule at 1006.30(a)(2) exempts furnishing to a nationwide specialty consumer reporting agency compiling check-writing history. Second, time-barred debt at 12 CFR 1006.26(b): "A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding." "Time-barred debt" is defined in 1006.26(a)(2) as a debt for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired, and "statute of limitations" in 1006.26(a)(1) as "the period prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to collect a debt." As codified, 1006.26(b) contains no knowledge or reasonable-belief qualifier. Which limitations period applies, whether it was tolled, whether a payment or acknowledgment revived it, and whether a contractual choice-of-law clause selects a different state's period are all questions of state law that the federal rule does not answer.

What records does Regulation F require a collector to keep, and for how long?

12 CFR 1006.100(a) requires a debt collector to "retain records that are evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the FDCPA and this part starting on the date that the debt collector begins collection activity on a debt until three years after the debt collector's last collection activity on the debt." The clock runs from last activity, not from placement or from the date of a communication, so an account worked intermittently over years carries a retention tail extending well past the FDCPA's one-year limitations period in 15 U.S.C. 1692k(d), which runs "within one year from the date on which the violation occurs." A separate rule at 1006.100(b) covers recordings: "If a debt collector records telephone calls made in connection with the collection of a debt, the debt collector must retain the recording of each such telephone call for three years after the date of the call." That is a conditional obligation — Regulation F does not require call recording, but it fixes the retention period for whatever recordings exist. Note the practical interaction with 1006.14(b): because 1006.14(b)(3)(ii) excludes calls "Not connected to the dialed number" from the counts, and because the presumptions run per person and per debt, any defense to a call-frequency claim rests on proving which calls were placed, to whom, about which debt, and whether each connected. 1006.100(a) is what makes that record a required artifact rather than a discretionary one. State record retention rules, state call-recording consent law, and client or creditor contract terms may require longer periods or additional artifacts.

Did the CFPB's 2025 guidance withdrawals change Regulation F?

They did not change the regulation, but they changed what a collector can rely on. On May 12, 2025, the CFPB published "Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, and Advisory Opinions; Withdrawal" at 90 FR 20084, stating "DATES: The withdrawals are applicable as of May 12, 2025." The withdrawn advisory opinions include three Regulation F items: "Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F); Deceptive and Unfair Collection of Medical Debt, 89 FR 80715 (Oct. 4, 2024)"; "Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F); Time-Barred Debt, 88 FR 26475 (May 1, 2023)"; and "Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F); Pay-to-Pay Fees, 87 FR 39733 (July 5, 2022)." The Bureau stated that "While some guidance might be reissued in the future, the Bureau does not intend to prioritize the enforcement of such guidance against parties that do not conform to the guidance during the pendency of any withdrawal." Two consequences follow. First, the codified rules those opinions interpreted are untouched: 12 CFR 1006.26 and 12 CFR 1006.22(b) — the latter being the "Collection of unauthorized amounts" provision implementing FDCPA section 808(1), which the pay-to-pay opinion construed — remain in the CFR as written, and withdrawal of an interpretation does not repeal a regulation. Second, the good-faith safe harbor in 15 U.S.C. 1692k(e), which shields conduct done "in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Bureau," has fewer live opinions to attach to in this area as of July 2026. Withdrawal also binds only the CFPB — it does not bind state attorneys general, state regulators, or private FDCPA plaintiffs, and courts are not obliged to follow Bureau guidance either way.

What does Regulation F not decide, and what can a compliance system not promise about it?

Regulation F resolves fewer questions than its length suggests. It does not preempt state law: 12 CFR 1006.104 mirrors 15 U.S.C. 1692n, providing that state law survives "except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of the Act or the corresponding provisions of this part, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency," and that a state law is not inconsistent "if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater." State call limits, licensing, disclosure, and pleading-proof requirements therefore sit on top of the part and vary by state. It does not cover first-party creditors. It does not address the TCPA, state consent law, or state call-recording law. Its central innovation, the 1006.14(b)(2) call frequency rule, creates rebuttable presumptions in both directions, not a safe harbor, and speaks only to FDCPA section 806(5) rather than the rest of section 806. Where the rule uses standards rather than numbers — "reasonable period of time" in 1006.30(a)(1), "reasonably expected to provide actual notice" in 1006.42(a)(1), "overshadow or are inconsistent with" in 1006.38(b)(1) — the outcome depends on facts and on how a given court reads them. Software can encode a rule, block an action, and preserve the record that 1006.100 requires. It cannot certify that a firm complies with Regulation F, resolve which state's limitations period governs an account, or decide whether a particular letter overshadows. Those remain legal judgments.

This is an informational reference, not legal advice, and using it creates no attorney-client relationship. Limitations periods turn on facts this page cannot know — which state's law governs, the contract type, when the claim accrued, and whether anything tolled or revived it. Confirm against the primary source and your own counsel before acting.