What Is Regulation F (12 CFR Part 1006), and What Did It Add to the FDCPA?

How Does the 7-in-7 Call Frequency Rule in 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2) Actually Count?

12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2)(i) presumes compliance with the FDCPA's repeated-call prohibition if a collector places no more than seven calls to a particular person about a particular debt in seven consecutive days, and no call within seven consecutive days after a telephone conversation about that debt. Both presumptions are rebuttable, and counting runs per debt.

What exactly does 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2) say?

The operative text of the call frequency rule in Regulation F is short. 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(1) states the underlying prohibition: "In connection with the collection of a debt, a debt collector must not place telephone calls or engage any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number." That mirrors FDCPA section 806(5), 15 U.S.C. 1692d(5). Paragraph (b)(2), headed "Telephone call frequencies; presumptions of compliance and violation," then adds at (b)(2)(i): "Subject to the exclusions in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, a debt collector is presumed to comply with paragraph (b)(1) of this section and FDCPA section 806(5) (15 U.S.C. 1692d(5)) if the debt collector places a telephone call to a particular person in connection with the collection of a particular debt neither: (A) More than seven times within seven consecutive days; nor (B) Within a period of seven consecutive days after having had a telephone conversation with the person in connection with the collection of such debt. The date of the telephone conversation is the first day of the seven-consecutive-day period." Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) supplies the reverse: a collector "is presumed to violate" (b)(1) and section 806(5) if it places calls "in excess of either of the telephone call frequencies described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)." Because (b)(2)(i) is phrased in the conjunctive — "neither ... nor" — both prongs must be satisfied for the compliance presumption to apply. The rule was published at 85 FR 76734 on November 30, 2020 and took effect November 30, 2021. As of July 2026 the text is unchanged: the eCFR version history for 1006.14 records a single amendment date of November 30, 2021, and eCFR title 12 was current through July 23, 2026 when this page was verified.

Does the seven-call limit count per consumer or per debt?

Per debt. 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(4) provides: "For purposes of this paragraph (b), particular debt means each of a consumer's debts in collection. However, in the case of student loan debts, the term particular debt means all student loan debts that a consumer owes or allegedly owes that were serviced under a single account number at the time the debts were obtained by a debt collector." A consumer with three placed accounts therefore has three separate seven-call budgets. This is not merely an inference from the definition — official commentary 14(b)(4)-2.i works the example directly: a collector pursuing one medical debt and two credit card debts from the same consumer places seven unanswered calls about each within seven consecutive days, 21 calls in total, and is presumed to comply with 1006.14(b)(1). The counting mechanics are set out in official commentary 14(b)(4)-1.i: if a call initiates a conversation or leaves a voicemail about one particular debt, it counts against that debt; if it addresses more than one particular debt, the collector counts it against each such debt; and if the collector "places a telephone call to a person but neither initiates a conversation about a particular debt nor leaves a voicemail that refers to a particular debt, or if the debt collector's telephone call is unanswered, the debt collector counts the telephone call as a telephone call in connection with the collection of at least one particular debt." That last clause is the hard one operationally: unanswered dials must be attributed to at least one debt, and the attribution logic a dialer uses is what an examiner or plaintiff will test. Note also that a 21-call week presumed compliant under (b)(4) is still exposed to the concentration and pacing factors in commentary 14(b)(2)(i)-2, discussed below.

What is the seven-day bar after a telephone conversation, and when does the clock start?

12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2)(i)(B) bars a call "Within a period of seven consecutive days after having had a telephone conversation with the person in connection with the collection of such debt," and fixes the start: "The date of the telephone conversation is the first day of the seven-consecutive-day period." This is a separate and independent prong from the seven-call limit — a collector who has placed only one call all week still loses the compliance presumption by calling inside the post-conversation window. It does not matter who placed the call that produced the conversation. Official commentary 14(b)(2)(i)-1.ii gives the example: "On Thursday, August 13, a consumer places a telephone call to, and initiates a telephone conversation with, a debt collector regarding a particular debt. Assume that the debt collector does not place a telephone call to the consumer in connection with the collection of that debt again prior to Thursday, August 20. The debt collector is presumed to comply." Commentary 14(b)(4)-1.ii adds that a discussion of a debt counts "regardless of which party initiated the discussion about the particular debt," and that where no particular debt is discussed, the conversation counts as one in connection with the collection of at least one particular debt. An inbound consumer call that turns into a substantive conversation therefore starts the seven-day clock against the collector. The bar can be lifted by prior consent under (b)(3)(i): commentary 14(b)(3)(i)-3.i works the example of a consumer who, during a Friday conversation, asks the collector to call back on Monday, and the Monday call does not offend (b)(2)(i)(B).

Which calls do not count toward the 7-in-7 limits?

12 CFR 1006.14(b)(3) provides that "Telephone calls placed to a person do not count toward the telephone call frequencies described in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section if they are" one of three things. First, calls "Placed with such person's prior consent given directly to the debt collector and within a period no longer than seven consecutive days after receiving the prior consent, with the date the debt collector receives prior consent counting as the first day of the seven-consecutive-day period." Official commentary 14(b)(3)(i)-2 explains that this consent expires when the person consented for a shorter period and that period has ended, when the person revokes consent, or when the collector has a telephone conversation with the person regarding the particular debt. That third trigger matters — reaching the consumer burns the consent window and restarts the (b)(2)(i)(B) bar. Commentary 14(b)(3)(i)-1 also warns that nothing in the prior-consent exclusion permits a collector to communicate or attempt to communicate as prohibited by 1006.6(b) or 1006.14(h). Second, calls "Not connected to the dialed number." Third, calls "Placed to the persons described in § 1006.6(d)(1)(ii) through (vi)" — the consumer's attorney, a consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the creditor's attorney, and the debt collector's attorney. Note what is absent: an ordinary third party contacted for location information is not on that list. Commentary 14(b)(2)(i)-1.iii confirms that location-information calls to a third party do count against the seven-call figure, working an example in which a collector places a total of seven such calls to a third party and is presumed to comply. Section 1006.10(c) separately bars more than one such communication "unless requested to do so by such person, or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information."

Does a call that rings unanswered or goes to voicemail count toward the 7-in-7 limits?

Yes to both. The exclusion in 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(3)(ii) is narrow — it covers only calls "Not connected to the dialed number" — and official commentary 14(b)(3)(ii)-1 draws the line precisely. A call does not connect if, for example, the collector receives a busy signal or an indication that the dialed number is not in service. Conversely, a call connects if, for example, it is answered even if it subsequently drops; if it causes a telephone to ring at the dialed number but no one answers; or if it is connected to a voicemail or other recorded message, even if it does not cause a telephone to ring and even if the collector is unable to leave a voicemail. So a ring-no-answer counts, a call routed to voicemail counts even with no message left, and an answered call that drops counts. There is a separate carve-out for wrong numbers in commentary 14(b)(2)(i)-3: where a collector places calls to a number during a seven-day period and then learns the number is not that person's number, those calls are not considered to have been placed to that person during that period. In the worked example, two unanswered calls to a misdirected number are treated as zero calls to the consumer once the misdirection is discovered. Because the distinction turns on dispositions the telephony platform records, retention of that record is what makes the count provable — and under 12 CFR 1006.100(a) those records are kept from the date collection activity begins "until three years after the debt collector's last collection activity on the debt," not for a flat three years.

Do text messages, emails, and ringless voicemails count as calls under 1006.14(b)?

Official commentary 14(b)-1 answers this directly: for purposes of 1006.14(b)(1) through (4), "placing a telephone call" includes conveying a ringless voicemail but does not include sending an electronic message, such as a text message or an email, that may be received on a mobile telephone. Ringless voicemail is therefore inside the count; texts and emails are outside it. That does not make electronic outreach unlimited. Commentary 14(a)-2.i supplies a worked example in which a collector stays within the 1006.14(b)(2)(i) frequencies, is presumed to comply with (b)(1), and yet the cumulative effect of the collector's telephone calls and emails is harassment — and when that natural consequence occurs, the collector has violated 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806. Electronic channels also carry their own Regulation F duties: the opt-out disclosure required in an electronic communication or attempt under 12 CFR 1006.6(e), the medium-specific prohibition in 1006.14(h)(1) — "a debt collector must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a person through a medium of communication if the person has requested that the debt collector not use that medium" — and the third-party-disclosure procedures in 1006.6(d)(3) through (5). Texting and prerecorded or autodialed calling are separately governed by the TCPA and state consent law, which Regulation F does not address.

What can rebut the presumption of compliance under 1006.14(b)(2)(i)?

The presumption of compliance is not a safe harbor. Official commentary 14(b)(2)(i)-2 states that to rebut it, it must be proven that a collector who did not exceed either frequency in 1006.14(b)(2)(i) nevertheless placed calls or engaged a person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, and adds that it is assumed debt collectors intend the natural consequence of their actions. Four non-exhaustive factors follow. First, the frequency and pattern of calls including intervals, with the commentary flagging calls placed "in rapid succession (e.g., two unanswered telephone calls to the same telephone number within five minutes)" or "in a highly concentrated manner (e.g., seven telephone calls to the same telephone number within one day)." The worked example makes the point: after one call on Wednesday, April 1, six additional calls on Friday, April 3 keeps the collector at seven-in-seven, but the high concentration of calls on that Friday is a factor that may rebut the presumption of compliance. Second, the frequency and pattern of voicemails, on the same rapid-succession and concentration measures. Third, the content of prior communications — whether the person said they did not wish to be contacted again about the debt, refused to pay, or denied owing it, including a 1006.6(c) cease notice or a 1006.14(h) medium request. Fourth, the collector's conduct in prior communications, such as obscene or abusive language, threats of violence, or calling at an inconvenient time under 1006.6(b)(1). Pacing, not just volume, is what the factors measure.

What can rebut the presumption of a violation under 1006.14(b)(2)(ii)?

Exceeding either frequency creates a presumption of violation, but it too is rebuttable. Official commentary 14(b)(2)(ii)-2 requires proof that a collector who placed calls in excess of either frequency described in 1006.14(b)(2)(i) nevertheless did not place calls or engage any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass, again assuming collectors intend the natural consequences of their actions. It lists four non-exhaustive factors. First, whether the collector placed the call to comply with, or as required by, applicable law — the example given is a call to inform a consumer of loss mitigation options under Regulation X, 12 CFR 1024.39(a). Second, whether the call was directly related to active litigation involving the collection of a particular debt, with examples of a court-ordered communication and a call made as part of settlement negotiations in an active collection suit. Third, whether the call responded to a consumer's request for additional information in circumstances where the 1006.14(b)(3)(i) prior-consent exclusion did not apply. Fourth — a factor often overlooked — whether the collector placed the call to convey information giving the consumer an opportunity to avoid a demonstrably negative effect relating to collection of the particular debt, where that effect was outside the collector's control and time was of the essence. The litigation factor is directly relevant to creditor-side firms: a call to negotiate a pending suit is not automatically excluded from the count, but its relationship to active litigation is a factor that may rebut. Because these are rebuttal factors and not exclusions, the burden lands on the collector after the count is exceeded, which makes contemporaneous documentation of the reason for each over-limit call the operative control.

Does staying under 7-in-7 mean a calling program is compliant?

No, and the rule is explicit about its own reach. 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2)(i) presumes compliance only with "paragraph (b)(1) of this section and FDCPA section 806(5)" — not with section 806 generally. Official commentary 14(b)(1)-1 confirms that a collector who complies with (b)(1) complies with 1006.14(a) and FDCPA section 806 "solely with respect to the frequency of its telephone calls," and could nevertheless violate them if another aspect of the calls, unrelated to frequency, has the natural consequence of harassment; the worked example is a call within the limits that leaves an obscene voicemail. Beyond that, the presumption says nothing about calling at an inconvenient time under 12 CFR 1006.6(b)(1) or 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a)(1), about contact with a represented consumer, about a cease-communication notice, about medium-specific requests under 1006.14(h), or about the TCPA and state consent law. State law can impose stricter call caps: 12 CFR 1006.104 provides that "a State law is not inconsistent with the Act or the corresponding provisions of this part if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater," and 15 U.S.C. 1692n is to the same effect. As of July 2026, the applicable contact-frequency limit must therefore be determined per jurisdiction, and client and creditor contracts routinely set tighter caps than the regulation. Finally, the counting inputs themselves — which debt a dial was attributed to, whether the call connected, whether a conversation occurred — are facts a system records rather than facts it decides. A dialer or workflow tool can enforce a cap, block a dial inside the post-conversation window, and preserve the disposition record that 12 CFR 1006.100(a) requires as evidence of compliance; the separate three-years-from-the-date-of-the-call rule in 1006.100(b) applies to call recordings, not to disposition data. No such system can make the presumption unrebuttable, and no system can guarantee compliance with 1006.14.

This is an informational reference, not legal advice, and using it creates no attorney-client relationship. Limitations periods turn on facts this page cannot know — which state's law governs, the contract type, when the claim accrued, and whether anything tolled or revived it. Confirm against the primary source and your own counsel before acting.