# TCPA Consent and Revocation: What Do 47 U.S.C. 227 and 47 CFR 64.1200 Require for Collection Calls and Texts?

> Consent and revocation under 47 U.S.C. 227 and 47 CFR 64.1200 for collection calls and texts: prior express consent, written consent, ten-business-day rule.

- Source: https://ottoforfirms.com/compliance/tcpa/
- Publisher: Otto — https://ottoforfirms.com
- Updated: 2026-07-26
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47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) bars autodialed or prerecorded calls to wireless numbers absent prior express consent; 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(2) adds a written-consent requirement only for telemarketing. Since April 11, 2025, 64.1200(a)(10) permits revocation by any reasonable method, honored within ten business days. The statute's government-debt exception was severed in 2020.

## Key facts

- 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(10) requires revocation requests to be honored "within a reasonable time not to exceed ten business days from receipt of such request."
- FCC Order DA 26-12 extended to January 31, 2027 a waiver of the 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(10) requirement that revocation on one message type stop a caller's unrelated robocalls.
- 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B) provides "$500 in damages for each such violation," which a court may in its discretion increase up to threefold for a willful or knowing violation.
- The government-debt exception printed in 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) was invalidated and severed in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants (2020), so callers cannot rely on it.
- Because the FCC's 2008 ACA International ruling found debt collection calls are not telemarketing, the written-consent rule in 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(2) generally does not reach account-servicing calls.
- McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., No. 23-1226 (2025), held "a district court is not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation"; FCC rulings are now only persuasive.

## Does the TCPA require consent before calling a debtor's cell phone with a dialer or a prerecorded voice?

As of July 2026, yes. 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A) makes it unlawful "to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice," and clause (iii) reaches "any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call." 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(1) mirrors the prohibition. Two features of the printed text mislead if read literally. First, clause (iii) as codified still ends "unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States," but in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants (July 6, 2020) the Supreme Court concluded that "the 2015 government-debt exception must be invalidated and severed from the remainder of the statute"; a collections firm cannot rely on it, including on federally guaranteed student loan portfolios. Second, the autodialer definition is narrow. Section 227(a)(1) covers equipment with the capacity "(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers," and in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid (April 1, 2021) the Court held that "a necessary feature of an autodialer under §227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to either store or produce phone numbers to be called." Whether a particular predictive dialer or click-to-dial platform meets that test turns on the equipment's actual capacity and is litigated case by case. Note that the artificial-or-prerecorded-voice prong applies regardless of the dialer question.

## Where does prior express consent for a collection call to a wireless number come from, and who has to prove it?

The FCC addressed this directly in its ACA International Declaratory Ruling, FCC 07-232, released January 4, 2008. The Commission concluded that "the provision of a cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a credit application, reasonably evidences prior express consent by the cell phone subscriber to be contacted at that number regarding the debt." The ruling then limits itself in three ways that matter operationally. Consent "is deemed to be granted only if the wireless number was provided by the consumer to the creditor, and that such number was provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed" — so a number obtained by skip trace, from a third party, from a credit report, or after the account was opened is outside what the ruling covers. Burden sits with the creditor: "the creditor should be responsible for demonstrating that the consumer provided prior express consent." And attribution follows the creditor: "Calls placed by a third party collector on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself placed the call." As of July 2026 this remains a declaratory ruling rather than text in the Code of Federal Regulations, and after McLaughlin (2025) a district court is not bound by it. For a firm taking placements, the practical consequence is that the consent record is a document the creditor must supply at placement, not something the firm can generate.

## When does a collection call or text need prior express written consent rather than ordinary prior express consent?

The distinction in 47 CFR 64.1200 turns on content, not on the caller's identity. Under 64.1200(a)(1), an autodialed or artificial/prerecorded-voice call to a wireless number needs prior express consent. Under 64.1200(a)(2), a call that "includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing," made with an autodialer or artificial or prerecorded voice to the same numbers, requires prior express written consent. Section 64.1200(f)(9) defines that term as "an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered," and requires a clear and conspicuous disclosure plus a statement that signing is not a condition of purchase. Straight collection activity is generally outside this: in the 2008 ACA International ruling the FCC agreed that "calls solely for the purpose of debt collection are not telephone solicitations and do not constitute telemarketing." The exposure arises when a message cross-sells settlement products, refinancing, credit repair, or affiliated services, at which point the same call needs signed written consent. As of July 2026, the text of 64.1200(f)(9) in the Code of Federal Regulations contains no one-to-one consent requirement.

## How can a consumer revoke TCPA consent, and how quickly must a collections firm act on it?

47 CFR 64.1200(a)(10) provides that a called party may revoke prior express consent, including prior express written consent, to receive calls or texts made under paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) and (c)(2) "by using any reasonable method to clearly express a desire not to receive further calls or text messages from the caller or sender." Three routes are per se reasonable: an automated interactive voice or key-press opt-out mechanism on a call; the words "stop," "quit," "end," "revoke," "opt out," "cancel," or "unsubscribe" sent in reply to an incoming text; or use of a website or telephone number the caller designated to process opt-outs. Other reply wording must be treated as valid "if a reasonable person would understand those words to have conveyed a request to revoke consent." If a texting protocol does not accept reply texts, the sender must disclose that clearly and conspicuously on each text and give reasonable alternative ways to revoke. All requests made in any reasonable manner "must be honored within a reasonable time not to exceed ten business days from receipt of such request," and callers "may not designate an exclusive means to request revocation of consent." Section 64.1200(a)(11) adds that revocation by other means, such as a voicemail or email to any number or address intended to reach the caller, "creates a rebuttable presumption that the consumer has revoked consent" once the called party produces evidence the request was made, resolved by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. As of July 2026, (a)(10) and (a)(11) have been effective since April 11, 2025.

## Does a revocation given to one business line stop calls from every part of the same caller?

Not yet, under an FCC waiver a compliance officer at a collections firm should track by date. The FCC's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau waived 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(10) "to the extent the rule requires callers to treat a request to revoke consent made by a called party in response to one type of informational message as applicable to all future robocalls and robotexts from that caller on unrelated matters." Order DA 25-312, released April 7, 2025, delayed that requirement to April 11, 2026; Order DA 26-12, released January 6, 2026, ordered "that the effective date of section 64.1200(a)(10) is extended to January 31, 2027 to the extent discussed herein." The waiver is narrow. DA 25-312 states that "[t]his ruling does not otherwise delay the effective date of the other rules adopted in the TCPA Consent Order," and its footnote 24 identifies those as "amendments to sections 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F) and (d)(3) and new section 64.1200(a)(11)," adding that "[c]ompliance with those rules is required as of April 11, 2025." Everything else in 64.1200(a)(10) — the reasonable-method standard, the per se list, the ten-business-day deadline, and the no-exclusive-means rule — is in force. As of July 2026 the January 31, 2027 date is provisional: in the Further Notice adopted October 28, 2025 (FCC 25-76, published at 90 FR 56101 on December 5, 2025) the Commission proposed to amend 64.1200(a)(10), noting that "commenters in the Delete Proceeding asked us to permit callers to designate the exclusive means by which consumers may revoke prior express consent rather than requiring callers to honor all revocation requests made using 'reasonable means.'" Comments closed January 5, 2026 and no final rule had issued as of this writing.

## May a collections firm send a confirmation text after receiving a stop request?

Yes, once, on conditions set out in 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(12). A one-time text confirming a revocation request does not violate 64.1200(a)(1) or (a)(2) "as long as the confirmation text merely confirms the text recipient's revocation request and does not include any marketing or promotional information, and is the only additional message sent to the called party after receipt of the revocation request." Timing carries a presumption: "If the confirmation text is sent within five minutes of receipt, it will be presumed to fall within the consumer's prior express consent. If it takes longer, however, the sender will have to make a showing that such delay was reasonable." Where the recipient had consented to several categories of messages, the confirmation may ask which categories the revocation covers, but the sender "must cease all further texts for which consent is required absent further clarification that the recipient wishes to continue to receive certain text messages." Section 64.1200(a)(12) was effective April 4, 2024, ahead of the rest of the 2024 revocation package, which took effect April 11, 2025. A debt collector should also check 12 CFR 1006.14(h)(2)(i), which separately permits an electronic confirmation of an opt-out request containing no information other than a statement confirming the request and that the collector will honor it.

## Do the internal do-not-call rules in 47 CFR 64.1200(d) apply to a firm that only makes collection calls?

Often not, but the answer depends on what the firm's calls actually are. Section 64.1200(d) is triggered by initiating "any artificial or prerecorded-voice telephone call pursuant to an exemption under paragraphs (a)(3)(ii) through (v) of this section or any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber." Because the FCC concluded in 2008 that collection calls "do not constitute telemarketing," a firm placing only account-servicing calls is generally outside (d) — though that conclusion rests on a declaratory ruling a district court need not follow after McLaughlin, and 64.1200(e) extends paragraphs (c) and (d) to wireless numbers "to the extent described in" the FCC's Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153. Where (d) does apply, it imposes six minimum standards, not five: a written do-not-call policy "available upon demand" under (d)(1); training of personnel under (d)(2); recording the request and placing the name and number on the list at the time the request is made, honored "within a reasonable time from the date such request is made," a period that "may not exceed ten (10) business days from the receipt of such request," under (d)(3); identification of the individual caller, the entity on whose behalf the call is made, and a contact number or address under (d)(4); a default that the request applies to the particular entity and not to affiliates "unless the consumer reasonably would expect them to be included" under (d)(5); and maintenance of the record, since "[a] do-not-call request must be honored for 5 years from the time the request is made," under (d)(6). Separately, 64.1200(c)(2)(i)(D) conditions the national-registry safe harbor on "employing a version of the national do-not-call registry obtained from the administrator of the registry no more than 31 days prior to the date any call is made."

## What happens under the TCPA when a debtor's wireless number is reassigned to someone else?

Consent does not travel with the number, and the only regulatory shelter is narrow. 47 CFR 64.1200(m) provides that a person will not be liable under paragraph (a)(1), (2), or (3) for calling a number for which consent was previously obtained but which "at the time of the call" is no longer assigned to the subscriber who gave consent, if the person, "bearing the burden of proof and persuasion," demonstrates two things: that it verified through the Reassigned Numbers Database, using the most recent numbering information reported under paragraph (l), "by querying the database operated by the Administrator and receiving a response of 'no,'" that the number had not been permanently disconnected since consent was obtained; and that the call resulted from "the database erroneously returning a response of 'no'" to that query. The safe harbor therefore covers only database error. It does not cover a firm that skipped the query, queried stale data, or queried without the correct consent date, and it says nothing about numbers that changed hands without a permanent disconnect being reported. For a placement-driven operation, the operative inputs are the date consent was obtained per account and the query cadence relative to dialing.

## If a dialer or texting vendor mishandles an opt-out, is the collections firm still liable?

For do-not-call requests, 47 CFR 64.1200(d)(3) resolves it against the firm: "If such requests are recorded or maintained by a party other than the person or entity on whose behalf the call is made, the person or entity on whose behalf the call is made will be liable for any failures to honor the do-not-call request." The parallel provision for fax opt-outs at 64.1200(a)(4)(v) uses the same construction, placing failure on "the sender on whose behalf the unsolicited advertisement is sent." The FCC's 2008 ACA International ruling points the same direction for collection calling generally: "Calls placed by a third party collector on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself placed the call." For a creditor-side firm that outsources dialing, hosted telephony, or SMS delivery, the regulation attributes the failure to the entity on whose behalf the call was placed, not to the vendor's records system. Contractual indemnity between firm and vendor allocates cost between those two parties; it does not change the regulatory attribution, and it does not change what a bank's vendor-oversight analyst will ask for.

## Can a collections firm rely on an FCC interpretation to defeat a TCPA claim in federal court?

Less reliably than before. In McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 23-1226, decided June 20, 2025, the Supreme Court held that "[i]n an enforcement proceeding, a district court is not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation," and that district courts "must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation." The case arose under 47 U.S.C. 227 itself, over an FCC declaratory ruling interpreting "telephone facsimile machine." For a collections firm the consequence is concrete: the 2008 ACA International consent ruling and the FCC's 2015 revocation ruling are now persuasive rather than controlling in a private TCPA action, and a district court may read the statute differently. It cuts both ways — an FCC interpretation adverse to a defendant is equally open to independent judicial review. Note the limit of the holding: it addresses an agency's interpretation of a statute in an enforcement proceeding, not the validity of a duly promulgated rule such as 64.1200(a)(10) itself.

## Do the TCPA rules replace the Regulation F call-frequency limits for debt collectors?

No. The TCPA and Regulation F are separate regimes that apply simultaneously to a collections firm that is a debt collector under the FDCPA. 12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2)(i) presumes compliance with 1006.14(b)(1) and FDCPA section 806(5) if the collector places calls to a particular person about a particular debt neither "[m]ore than seven times within seven consecutive days" nor "[w]ithin a period of seven consecutive days after having had a telephone conversation with the person in connection with the collection of such debt," and 1006.14(b)(2)(ii) presumes a violation above either frequency. Three categories of calls are excluded from the counts by 1006.14(b)(3): calls placed with the person's prior consent given directly to the collector within the following seven days, calls not connected to the dialed number, and calls to the persons described in 1006.6(d)(1)(ii) through (vi). Regulation F also carries its own medium opt-out at 12 CFR 1006.14(h)(1): a debt collector "must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a person through a medium of communication if the person has requested that the debt collector not use that medium to communicate with the person." A call pattern that is compliant under Regulation F may still be a TCPA violation if consent was revoked or never existed, and a fully consented autodialed campaign may still breach the FDCPA frequency presumption.

## What is the damages exposure under the TCPA, and what can a compliance system actually guarantee?

Under 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3), a private plaintiff may bring "an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater," and if the court finds the defendant "willfully or knowingly" violated the subsection or the rules under it, the court "may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B)." Because liability accrues per call or text, exposure in a high-volume dialing operation is a function of list hygiene rather than of any single decision. Software can enforce a suppression list, timestamp receipt of a revocation, evidence that the ten-business-day clock in 64.1200(a)(10) was met, hold the query records the 64.1200(m) safe harbor requires, and retain a do-not-call record for the five years 64.1200(d)(6) requires. Software cannot establish that consent was validly obtained in the first place, determine whether a given dialing platform has the capacity Duguid requires, decide whether particular reply wording conveyed revocation under the reasonable-person test, or predict how a district court will read an FCC ruling after McLaughlin. Those are legal judgments. No vendor, and no page like this one, can guarantee TCPA compliance; this is not legal advice.

## Primary sources

1. [47 U.S.C. § 227 (Cornell LII, current)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/227)
   > an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater
1. [47 CFR § 64.1200 (eCFR, verified against the July 23, 2026 title snapshot)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-47/chapter-I/subchapter-B/part-64/subpart-L/section-64.1200)
   > All requests to revoke prior express consent or prior express written consent made in any reasonable manner must be honored within a reasonable time not to exceed ten business days from receipt of such request.
1. [FCC Order DA 26-12 (CGB, released Jan. 6, 2026), CG Docket No. 02-278](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-12A1.pdf)
   > IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the effective date of section 64.1200(a)(10) is extended to January 31, 2027 to the extent discussed herein.
1. [FCC Order DA 25-312 (CGB, released Apr. 7, 2025), CG Docket No. 02-278, n.24](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-312A1.pdf)
   > Those rules include amendments to sections 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F) and (d)(3) and new section 64.1200(a)(11). Compliance with those rules is required as of April 11, 2025.
1. [FCC, Strengthening the Ability of Consumers To Stop Robocalls, 89 FR 82518 (Oct. 11, 2024) (effective-date announcement)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/11/2024-23605/strengthening-the-ability-of-consumers-to-stop-robocalls)
   > The effective date for the amendments to 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F) and (d)(3) and the addition of 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(10) and (11), published March 5, 2024, at 89 FR 15756 is April 11, 2025.
1. [FCC, Strengthening the Ability of Consumers To Stop Robocalls, 89 FR 15756 (Mar. 5, 2024) (Report and Order, FCC 24-24)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/05/2024-04587/strengthening-the-ability-of-consumers-to-stop-robocalls)
   > Amendatory instruction 2 (adding 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(12)) is effective April 4, 2024, and amendatory instruction 3 (revising 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F) and (d)(3) and adding 47 CFR 64.1200(a)(10) and (11)) is delayed indefinitely.
1. [FCC, Advanced Methods To Target and Eliminate Robocalls, 90 FR 56101 (Dec. 5, 2025) (FNPRM, FCC 25-76; comments closed Jan. 5, 2026)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/05/2025-22063/advanced-methods-to-target-and-eliminate-robocalls)
   > commenters in the Delete Proceeding asked us to permit callers to designate the exclusive means by which consumers may revoke prior express consent rather than requiring callers to honor all revocation requests made using "reasonable means."
1. [McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. ___ (June 20, 2025) (No. 23-1226)](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1226_1a72.pdf)
   > In an enforcement proceeding, a district court is not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation.
1. [Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S. 610 (July 6, 2020) (No. 19-631)](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf)
   > the 2015 government-debt exception must be invalidated and severed from the remainder of the statute
1. [Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395 (Apr. 1, 2021) (No. 19-511)](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-511_p86b.pdf)
   > We hold that a necessary feature of an autodialer under §227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to either store or produce phone numbers to be called.
1. [FCC, ACA International Declaratory Ruling, FCC 07-232 (released Jan. 4, 2008), CG Docket No. 02-278](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-07-232A1.pdf)
   > calls solely for the purpose of debt collection are not telephone solicitations and do not constitute telemarketing
1. [12 CFR § 1006.14 (Regulation F, eCFR, verified against the July 23, 2026 title snapshot)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-X/part-1006/subpart-B/section-1006.14)
   > More than seven times within seven consecutive days

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This is an informational reference, not legal advice, and using it creates no attorney-client relationship. Limitations periods turn on facts this page cannot know — which state's law governs, the contract type, when the claim accrued, and whether anything tolled or revived it. Confirm against the primary source and your own counsel before acting.